We add a limited but useful form of quantification to Coalition Logic, a popular formalism for reasoning about cooperation in game-like multi-agent systems. The basic constructs of Quantified Coalition Logic (QCL) allow us to express such properties as "every coalition satisfying property P can achieve ϕ" and "there exists a coalition C satisfying property P such that C can achieve ϕ". We give an axiomatisation of QCL, and show that while it is no more expressive than Coalition Logic, it is nevertheless exponentially more succinct. The complexity of QCL model checking for symbolic and explicit state representations is shown to be no worse than that of Coalition Logic, and satisfiability for QCL is shown to be no worse than satisfiability for Coalition Logic. We illustrate the formalism by showing how to succinctly specify such social choice mechanisms as majority voting, which in Coalition Logic require specifications that are exponentially long in the number of agents.
270
Synthese (2008) 165:269-294 Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) (Alur et al. 2002) and Coalition Logic (CL) (Pauly 2001 ) have proved to be powerful and intuitive knowledge representation formalisms for such models. Many important properties of game-like cooperative scenarios require quantification over coalitions. However, existing cooperation logics provide no direct facility for such quantification, and expressing such properties therefore requires formulae that are exponentially long in the number of agents. Examples include expressing the notion of a weak veto player (Wooldridge and Dunne 2004) in CL, or solution concepts from cooperative game theory such as non-emptiness of the core in Coalitional Game Logic (Ågotnes et al. 2006 ). An obvious solution would be to extend, for example, ATL, with a first-order-style apparatus for quantifying over coalitions. In such a quantified ATL, one might express the fact that agent i is a necessary component of every coalition able to achieve ϕ by the following formula:
However, adding quantification in such a naive way leads to undecidability over infinite domains (using basic quantificational set theory we can define arithmetic), and very high computational complexity even over finite domains. The question therefore arises whether we can add quantification to cooperation logics in such a way that we can express useful properties of cooperation in games without making the resulting logic too computationally complex to be of practical interest. Here, we answer this question in the affirmative.
We introduce Quantified Coalition Logic (QCL), by modifying the existing cooperation modalities of CL in order to enable quantification. In CL, the basic cooperation constructs are C ϕ, meaning that coalition C can achieve ϕ; these operators are in fact modal operators with a neighbourhood semantics. In QCL, we replace these operators with expressions P ϕ and [P]ϕ; here, P is a predicate over coalitions, and the two sentences express the fact that there exists a coalition C satisfying property P such that C can achieve ϕ and all coalitions satisfying property P can achieve ϕ, respectively. Thus we add a limited form of quantification to CL without the apparatus of quantificational set theory. Our key contributions are twofold. First, we show that while QCL is equally expressive as CL, it is exponentially more succinct. And second, we show that QCL is no worse than CL with respect to the key computational problems of model checking and satisfiability.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After briefly reviewing the main concepts of Pauly's Coalition Logic, we introduce a language for expressing coalition predicates, and show that the satisfiability problem for this language is NP-complete. We then introduce QCL itself, and give a complete axiomatisation. We show that while QCL is no more expressive than Coalition Logic (i.e., there are no properties expressible in QCL that can not be expressed in Coalition Logic), it is nevertheless exponentially more succinct, in a precise and formal sense. We then study two computational properties of the logic. First, we show that the complexity of the model checking problem is no worse than that of Coalition Logic, assuming an explicit representation of models. We also study the problem under a more realistic representation. Second, we show that the complexity of the satisfiability problem is also no worse than that of Coalition Logic. We then extend the language of coalition predicates in -S = {s 1 , . . . , s o } is a finite non-empty set of states; -E : 2 Ag × S → 2 2 S is an effectivity function, where T ∈ E(C, s) is intended to mean that from state s, the coalition C can cooperate to ensure that the next state will be a member of T -note that they cannot determine which of the members of T will occur-they can only be sure that it will be some member of T ; and -π: S → 2 0 is a valuation function, which for every state s ∈ S gives the set π (s) of Boolean variables that are satisfied at s.
It is possible to define a number of constraints on effectivity functions, depending upon exactly which kinds of scenario they are intended to model Pauly (2001, pp. 24-39) . Throughout this paper, we assume that models M are weak playability models M ∈ WP, in which effectivity functions have the following properties (Pauly 2001, p. 30 
): -Outcome monotonicity: ∀X ⊆ X ⊆ S, C ⊆ Ag, if X ∈ E(C, s) then X ∈ E(C, s) -∅ ∈ E(Ag, s) -∀C ⊆ C ⊆ Ag if ∅ ∈ E(C, s) then ∅ ∈ E(C , s) -∀C ⊆ Ag if ∅ ∈ E(∅, s) then S ∈ E(C, s) -Ag-maximality: ∀X ⊆ S ((S \ X ) ∈ E(∅, s) ⇒ X ∈ E(Ag, s))
[235]
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For a brief explanation of these assumptions, see below. By "model" we henceforth mean this general "weak playability model". For more restricted classes of models, see Pauly (2001) . An interpretation for CL is a pair M, s where M is a model and s is a state in M. The satisfaction relation "| C L " for CL holds between interpretations and formulae of CL. We say that coalition C can enforce ϕ in s if for some T ∈ E(C, s), ϕ is true in all t ∈ T . That is, C can make a choice such that, irrespective of the others' choices, ϕ will hold. Formally, the satisfaction relation is defined as follows:
Coming back to the constraints on weak playability models, note that the smaller a set X is that a coalition C can enforce, the more specific and stronger the property that they can ensure. Outcome monotonicity says that if a coalition C can enforce an outcome in a set, it can enforce an outcome in any bigger set. (Or: if C can enforce something, it also can enforce all its consequences). The second assumption says that the grand coalition Ag cannot achieve the ultimate strong property ⊥ (if ∅ ∈ E(Ag, s), we would have M, s | C L ⊥). Given this constraint, the third assumption ensures that in fact no coalition can achieve ⊥. Note that a generalisation of this third constraint, i.e., ∀C ⊆ C ⊆ Ag, ∀X ⊆ S if X ∈ E(C, s) then X ∈ E(C , s) (Coalition monotonicity) is not required here. Under the first three assumptions, the fourth one says that any coalition C can achieve something: It is equivalent to saying that there must be some X ∈ E(C, s), for every C and s. Supperaditivity explains how coalitions can join forces. If C 1 can enforce X 1 (satisfying ϕ 1 , for example) and C 2 can enforce X 2 (satisfying ϕ 2 ), then, given those coalitions are disjoint, they can both exercise their ability to enforce X 1 ∩ X 2 (they can guarantee ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 ). This requirement implies X ∈ E(Ag, s) ⇒ (S \ X ) ∈ E(∅, s). Now Ag-maximality is the converse of the latter. Its contraposition reads: If Ag cannot enforce X , it implies that (S \ X ) is already enforced, even by the coalition that takes no agents.
For a formula ϕ and model M, let ϕ M denote the set of states {s ∈ S : M, s | ϕ}.
The notions of truth of ϕ in a model (M | C L ϕ) and validity in a class of models C (C | C L ϕ) are defined as usual. The inference relation C L for CL is given in Table 1 (taken from Pauly 2001, but adapted to our notation): it is sound and complete with respect to the class of weak playability models W P (Pauly 2001, p. 55) . Table 1 Axioms and rules  for coalition logic In (Prop), ψ is a propositional tautology, in axiom (⊥), we require C ⊆ C, and for (S),
The idea behind Quantified Coalition Logic (QCL) is to avoid this blow-up in the length of formulae. Informally, QCL is a propositional modal logic, containing an indexed collection of unary modal operators P ϕ and [P]ϕ. The intended interpretation of P ϕ is that there exists a set of agents C, satisfying predicate P, such that C can achieve ϕ. We refer to expressions P as coalition predicates, and we now define a language for coalition predicates; QCL will then be parameterised with respect to such a language. Of course, many coalition predicate languages are possible, with different properties, and later we will investigate another such language. Throughout the remainder of this paper, we will assume a fixed, finite set Ag of agents.
Coalition predicates
Syntactically, we introduce two atomic predicates subseteq and supseteq, and derive other predicate forms from these. Formally, the syntax of coalition predicates is given by the following grammar:
where C ⊆ Ag is a set of agents. One can think of the atomic predicates subseteq(C) and supseteq(C) as a stock of 2 |Ag|+1 propositions, one for each coalition, which are then to be evaluated in a given coalition Co. The circumstances under which a concrete coalition Co satisfies a coalition predicate P, are specified by a satisfaction relation "| cp ", defined by the following four rules:
Now we can be precise about what it means that "a coalition Co satisfies P": it just means Co | cp P. We will assume the conventional definitions of implication (→), biconditional (↔), and conjunction (∧) in terms of ¬ and ∨.
Coalitional predicates subseteq(·) and supseteq(·) are in fact not independent. They are mutually definable-due to the fact that the set of all agents Ag is assumed to be finite. We then have that (Ågotnes and Walicki 2006) The reason that we include both types of predicates as primitives is a main motivating factor of this paper: we are interested in succinctly expressing quantification in coalition logic.
We find it convenient to make use of the following derived predicates:
The reader may note an obvious omission here: we have not introduced any explicit way of talking about the cardinality of coalitions; such predicates will be discussed in Sect. 6.
We say that a coalition predicate P is Ag-consistent if for some Co ⊆ Ag, we have Co | cp P, and P is Ag-valid if Co | cp P for all Co ⊆ Ag.
The model checking problem for coalition predicates is the problem of checking whether, for given Co and P, we have Co | cp P (Clarke et al. 2000) . It is easy to see that this problem is decidable in polynomial time. The satisfiability problem for coalition predicates is the problem of deciding whether P is consistent. We get the following.
Theorem 1 The satisfiability problem for coalition predicates is NP-complete.
Proof There is an easy reduction from SAT (Papadimitriou 1994, p. 171 ) that gives NP-hardness: given an instance ϕ of SAT, systematically replace every Boolean variable p that occurs in ϕ by incl( p). The resulting coalition predicate will clearly be satisfiable iff the SAT instance ϕ is satisfiable. To show membership in NP, we use a standard "guess and check" approach. However, we must first show that a coalition predicate P is satisfiable iff there is a coalition that is witness to this that is a "short certificate", i.e., of size at most polynomial in the size of the given coalition predicate P. The right-to-left direction is immediate, so consider the left-to-right direction. Let Ag(P) denote the set of all agents named in P. Suppose C | cp P. It is straightforward
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where each C i j appears in a supseteq(. . .) or subseteq(. . .) predicate in P, and so
We refer to four sets of constraints as C 1 constraints, C 2 constraints, and so on. Note that each C i could be empty. We reason by cases: -Case 1: there are C 1 constraints. In this case, C ⊆ (C 1 1 ∩ · · · ∩ C 1 k 1 ), and so |C| ≤ |Ag(P)|. -Case 2: there are no C 1 constraints. In this case, we know that:
So, let a * be a new element, not occurring in Ag(P) (in the case that Ag(P) = Ag we are done), and define
Notice that, so defined, |C * | ≤ |Ag(P)| + 1. By construction, C * satisfies properties C 2 , C 3 , and C 4 . The remaining cases are similarly straightforward. So, to verify that a coalition predicate P is satisfiable, we can (i) guess a coalition C such that |C| ≤ |Ag(P)| + 1; and (ii) verify that C | cp P, which can be done in time polynomial in the size of C and P. (Pauly 2001) . Informally, QCL is a propositional modal logic, containing an indexed collection of unary modal operators P ϕ and [P]ϕ, where P is a coalition predicate.
Formulae of QCL are defined by the following grammar (with respect to a set 0 of Boolean variables, a fixed set Ag of agents, and the language of coalition predicates):
where p ∈ 0 is an atomic proposition and P is a coalition predicate over Ag. As usual, we use parentheses to disambiguate formulae where necessary, and define the remaining connectives of classical logic as abbreviations:
Models for QCL are exactly the same as the models for CL (i.e., weak playability models), and interpretations for QCL are also the same as interpretations for CL, i.e., they are pairs M, s where M is a model and s is a state in M. The satisfaction relation "| QC L " for QCL holds between interpretations and formulae of CL. The satisfaction relation is defined by the following inductive rules:
Remark 1 Readers familiar with modal logic may wonder why we did not introduce the universal coalition modality [P]ϕ as the dual ¬ P ¬ϕ. In fact such a definition would not serve the desired purpose. Consider the pattern of quantifiers in the semantics of · : ∃∃∀. Taking the dual ¬ · ¬ would yield the quantifiers ∀∀∃, rather than the desired ∀∃∀ pattern. Of course, this does not mean that [P]ϕ is not definable from P ϕ (and the propositional connectives) in some other way. In fact:
Thus, for expressiveness, P together with the propositionals are adequate connectives, and [P]ϕ is definable. The reason we introduce the box cooperation modality as a separate construct is one of the main motivations in this paper, as discussed before for the different predicate operators: succinctness of expression.
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and, similarly for [[P]]:
In the following we summarise the interpretation of our four modalities. We say that coalition C can enforce ϕ in s if for some S ∈ E(C, s), ϕ is true in all s ∈ S. That is, C can make a choice such that, irrespective of the others' choices, ϕ.
]ϕ Some coalition satisfying P is unable to enforce ¬ϕ in s
Some QCL expressions
To get a flavour of the kind of properties we can express in QCL, we present some example QCL formulae. First, note that the conventional CL/ATL ability expression is defined simply as:
We can also succinctly express properties such as the solution concepts from Qualitative Coalitional Games (Wooldridge and Dunne 2004; Dunne et al. 2007 ). For example, a weak veto player for ϕ is an agent that must be present in any coalition that has the ability to bring about ϕ:
Of course, if no coalition has the ability to achieve ϕ, then this means that every agent is a veto player for ϕ. A strong veto player for ϕ is thus an agent that is both a weak veto player for ϕ and that is a member of some coalition that can achieve ϕ:
Finally, a dictator for ϕ is a weak veto player such that every coalition that includes that player is able to achieve ϕ:
Synthese (2008) 165:269-294 A coalition C is weakly minimal for ϕ if no subset of C can achieve ϕ:
And C is simply minimal if they are weakly minimal and also able to bring about ϕ:
Finally, GC(C) says that C is the grand coalition:
Expressiveness, axiomatisation and succinctness
We now argue that QCL is equivalent in expressive power to Coalition Logic. To begin, consider the following translation τ from QCL formulae to CL formulae.
We already know from the discussion above that we have a translation in the other direction: let us call it δ, with defining clause
As an example, suppose Ag = {a, b, c} and let
Hence, one can think of δ(τ (ϕ)) as a normal form for ϕ, where the only coalition predicate in ϕ is eq. That QCL and CL have equal expressive power follows from the fact that the two translations preserve truth.
Theorem 2 Let M be a model, and s a state, and let ϕ be a QCL formula, and ψ a CL formula. Then:
Proof The proof follows immediately from the definition of τ and δ. We consider only one of the inductive steps for each translation.
1. Suppose M, s | QC L P ϕ, and the theorem proven for ϕ. According to the truth-definition in QCL, there must be a coalition C for which C | cp P, and with an S ∈ E(C, s) such that for all s ∈ S, one has M, s | QC L ϕ. Using the induction hypothesis, this means that there is a coalition C such that C | cp P and for which M, s | C L C τ (ϕ). This can be written using only a CL formula:
Interpreting the disjunction, this means that there is some C for which C | cp P and for which M, s | C L C τ (ϕ). Using the induction hypothesis and the truth definition of 
Completeness
The translations introduced above provide the key to a complete axiomatisation of QCL. First, recall Pauly's axiomatisation of Coalition Logic (Table 1) . Given this, and the translations defined previously, we obtain an axiom system for QCL-formulae as follows. First, QCL includes the δ translation of all the CL axioms and rules, and axioms that state that the δ-translation is correct: see the lower part of Table 2 . On top of that, QCL is parametrised by an inference relation cp for coalition predicates. The axioms for this in Table 2 are taken from Ågotnes and Walicki (2006) .
Theorem 3
1. cp is sound and complete: for any P, 
Proof 1. Ågotnes and Walicki (2006) 2. This is almost immediate from the definition of QCL, and proven with induction of the length (ϕ) of the shortest proof in CL for ϕ. If (ϕ) = 1, then ϕ must be a CL-axiom, and hence we immediately have QC L δ(ϕ), by δ Ax. Now suppose our lemma is proven for all ψ for which (ψ) ≤ n and suppose that the shortest proof for ϕ is (ϕ) = n + 1. Now there are two possibilities:
(a) ϕ was obtained from C L ψ → ϕ and C L ψ using MP. Both ψ → ϕ and ψ have a CL proof of at most length n. The induction hypothesis hence yields that we have
This implication then has a proof in CL of at most n, so the induction hypothesis guarantees
and ϕ = p, we have δ(τ (ϕ)) = ϕ so the equivalence is obvious. Disjunction is also straightforward. Let us look at P ϕ, when the equivalence is already proven for ϕ and δ(τ (ϕ)).
The latter is, by completeness of cp , equivalent to {C | cp eq(C) → P}. So, we have
Using the induction hypothesis, the right hand side is equivalent to {C| cp eq(C)→P} eq(C) ϕ. The equivalence of the latter with P ϕ follows immediately from the cql axiom δ . The case for [P]ϕ is similar.
Theorem 4 (Completeness and Soundness
Proof We leave soundness to the reader. For completeness, suppose QC L ϕ. By Theorem 3.3, we have QC L δ(τ (ϕ) ). By Theorem 3.2, we then have C L τ (ϕ). By completeness for the logic CL, we then know that there is a pair M, s for which
Examples of derivable properties include:
These illustrate that we not only have primitive modal operators, but also some kind of operations over them, like negation and conjunction. This of course is very reminiscent of Boolean modal logic, where one studies algebraic operations like complement, meet and join on modal operators (Gargov and Passy 1987 ). We will not pursue the details of the connection here.
QCL is succinct
Theorem 2 tells us that the advantage of QCL over CL is not its expressivity. Rather, the benefit of QCL is in its succinctness of representation. For example, for the QCL formula any q, the translated CL formula τ ( any q) is exponentially longer, since it has to explicitly enumerate all coalitions in Ag. Is it however generally the case that τ (ϕ) is longer than ϕ? Since the translation does some computations under | cp , this is in general not the case. For instance, if ({a, b, d}) ), then ψ = P q would have as a τ -translation {a, b, c} q, which is shorter than the original QCL-formula ψ. But then again, δ(τ (ψ) ) is a QCL formula that is equivalent to ψ, but that has a size similar to τ (ψ).
To make this all precise, let us define the length (ϕ) of both QCL and CL formulae ϕ, as follows:
Let ϕ and ψ be X and Y formulae, respectively, where X and Y both range over CL and QCL. Then we say that they are equivalent with respect to some class of models if they have the same satisfying pairs M, s, that is, for each M, s in the class of models it is the case that M,
This definition naturally extends to sets of formulae.
In the following theorem we show that QCL is exponentially more succinct than CL, over general models. This notion of relative succinctness is taken from Lutz (2006) , who demonstrates that public announcement logic is more succinct than epistemic logic.
[245] 
Before the proof, we give some definitions and intermediate results.
For i ≥ 0, define a sequence of QCL formulae ϕ i (where denotes an arbitrary instance of a tautology in the coalition predicate language, for example subseteq(∅)∨ ¬subseteq(∅)):
We will show that every CL formula ψ i equivalent to ϕ i is of length at least 2 i , for all i ≥ 0.
Note that [ ] p expresses that every coalition can guarantee p. Let a = b ∈ Ag be two (distinct) agents. Define a sequence of CL formulae:
Let Seq * a,b denote all sequences s over the set {a, b} where s · t denotes appending sequence t to s. We will also denote such a sequence as st. Given a CL formula ϕ, define the set of sequences P ϕ as follows, where denotes the empty sequence:
Note that for ψ i , defined above, P ψ i is the set of all sequences over {a, b} of length at most i.
Let us call s ∈ P ϕ a P ϕ -maximal path if there is no t = such that s · t ∈ P ϕ . Note that if s is not P ψ i -maximal, then both sa and sb are in P ψ i .
Let χ be a CL formula that is equivalent to ψ i , for some i > 0. We show the following:
To show this, assume to the contrary that for some x ∈ Seq * a,b , we have x ∈ P ψ i , but x ∈ P χ . Given this x, define a model M = S, E, π as follows:
If s itself is already a maximal path, and does not have an extension in S, we define
for any other C. Finally, for each coalition C and every state y ∈ {A, B, Z }, define E(C, y) = E(C, s) for some arbitrary maximal path s.
We also define a second model M = S, E, π with the same states and effectivity function, where π ( x) = ∅ and π (s) = π(s) = {p} for all s = x. We argue that both M and M are playability models:
1. ∅ ∈ E(C, s) for any s and C 2. S ∈ E(C, s) for any s and C, by the definition of SC 3. Ag-maximality: let X ∈ E(Ag, s); we must show that S \ X ∈ E(∅, s). First, consider the case that s = s ∈ P ψ i and that s is not a
, so sa ∈ X and sb ∈ X and Z ∈ X .
That means that sa, sb, Z ∈ S \ X , so S \ X ∈ E(∅, s). Second, consider the cases that s = s ∈ P ψ i and that s is a maximal path, or that s ∈ {A, B, Z }. X ∈ SC({A}) ∪ SC({B}) ∪ SC({Z });
A ∈ X and B ∈ X and Z ∈ X ; A, B, Z ∈ S \ X ; S \ X ∈ E(∅, s) = SC({A, B, Z }). 4. Outcome-monotonicity: immediate from the definition. 5. Superadditivity: let X 1 ∈ E(C 1 , s) and X 2 ∈ E(C 2 , s). First consider the case that s = s ∈ P ψ i and s is not maximal: -C 1 = C 2 = ∅: sa, sb, Z ∈ X 1 and sa, sb, Z ∈ X 2 , so sa, sb, Z ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 and thus X 1 ∩ X 2 ∈ E(∅, s). -C 1 = ∅, C 2 = {a}: sa, sb, Z ∈ X 1 and sa, Z ∈ X 2 , and thus sa, Z ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 , and X 1 ∩ X 2 ∈ E({a}, s). -C 1 = ∅, C 2 = Ag: sa, sb, Z ∈ X 1 , and either sa ∈ X 2 or sb ∈ X 2 or Z ∈ X 2 . Wlog. assume the former first. Then sa ∈ X 1 ∩X 2 , and thus X 1 ∩ X 2 ∈ E(Ag, s).
SC({Z }) and thus X 1 ∩ X 2 ∈ E({a, b}, s). -C 1 = ∅, {a}, {b}, Ag: Z ∈ X 1 . Since C 1 and C 2 are assumed to be disjunct, C 2 = Ag, and observe that then Z ∈ X 2 as well. Thus, X ∈ X 1 ∩ X 2 . It is either the case that (i)
Second, the cases when s = s ∈ P ψ i and s is maximal and when s ∈ {A, B, Z } follow when sa is replaced by A and sb is replaced by B in the argument above.
Lemma 1 M, | ψ i and M , | ψ i .
[247] Proof In order to see that M, | ψ i holds, observe that ( p) M = S. It follows that ( C p) M = S for any C, and thus that ( C C p) M = S for any C , and so on.
To show that M , | ψ i , note that x must be of the form
with x i ∈ {a, b} and k ≤ i. It is easy to see that
. Inspecting the definition of E for C = {a} and C = {b}, we see that this means that (
Repeating this argument (k − 1 more times), we see that this implies that M , x 1 x 2 · · · x k | p. But this is not the case, because p ∈ π (x 1 · · · x k ), hence the contradiction.
Lemma 2

M, | χ iff M , | χ
Proof First, we show that for any s ∈ {A, B, Z }, we have that
for any ϕ by structural induction. The case ϕ = q, q ∈ 0 , is immediate, because
, (γ ) M ∈ E(C, s). E(C, s) = SC({A, B, Z }),
so it follows that for any y ∈ {A, B, Z }, M, y | γ . By the induction hypothesis, M , y | γ , and thus {A, B, Z } ⊆ (γ ) M and we have that (γ ) M ∈ E(C, s). The direction to the left is similar. For C = Ag and the direction to the right, let
Thus, M, y | γ for at least one y ∈ {A, B, Z }. By the induction hypothesis, M , y | γ for that y ∈ {A, B, Z }, and it follows that (γ ) M ∈ SC({y}) and thus that (γ ) M ∈ E(Ag, s). The direction to the left is similar. The arguments for other values of C are similar to C = ∅. The Booleans are straightforward. This completes the proof of (2). We now show that for all s ∈ P ψ i and ϕ ∈ sub(χ ), such that
we have
by induction over ϕ. The lemma follows immediately. Consider the case ϕ = q, q ∈ ϕ 0 . If q = p, then both M, s | q and M , s | q. Consider the case that q = p. Assume that M , s | p. By construction of M , the only possibility is that s = x. Because s ∈ P ψ i and ∈ P p , we have that s ∈ P χ by (3). But this contradicts the assumption that M , s | p, because by construction we have that x ∈ P χ . Thus, M , s | p for any s, and we also have that M, s | p for any s.
Consider the case
Thus, assume that s is not maximal. For the direction to the right, let M, s | ϕ, i.e., (γ ) M ∈ E(C, s). Assume first that C = {a}. (γ ) M ∈ SC({ sa, Z }), which implies that M, sa | γ and M, Z | γ . We have that { sw | w ∈ P ϕ } ⊆ P χ and because P ϕ = { } ∪ { aw | w ∈ P γ }, it follows that { saw | w ∈ P γ } ⊆ P χ . Thus we can use the induction hypothesis to conclude that Lemma 2 contradicts the fact that χ and ψ i are equivalent. Thus, (1) holds. We can now prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5
It now only suffices to show that (χ ) ≥ 2 i for any i. First, observe that for any i, and for any sequence x = x 1 · · · x k with k ≤ i and x i ∈ {a, b}, we have that x ∈ P ψ i . It follows immediately that (P ψ i ) ≥ 2 i . From (1) it follows that (P χ ) ≥ 2 i . For any formula ϕ it is the case that (ϕ) ≥ |P ϕ |, and it thus follows that (χ ) ≥ 2 i .
It is easy to see that the converse of Theorem 5 does not hold; it is not the case that CL is exponentially more succinct (in the sense of Theorem 5) than QCL. It is true that some CL formulae are strictly shorter than equivalent QCL formulae, but only by a constant factor. To see that the converse of the Theorem does not hold, take the translation δ(ϕ) of a CL formula ϕ. The former is effectively obtained by replacing every coalition C in ϕ with subseteq(C) ∧ supseteq(C), increasing the length by |C|+3 for each C occurring in ϕ. Thus, there is a constant k such that (δ(ϕ)) ≤ k (ϕ) (it suffices to take k = 5: an upper bound on the length of δ(ϕ) is found by assuming that every symbol in ϕ is a coalition symbol C = {a}).
Model checking and satisfiability
When one is interested in the computational properties of a logic, there are two fundamentally important questions of interest. The first relates to the complexity of model checking; and the second relates to the complexity of satisfiability.
Complexity of model checking
Model checking is currently regarded as perhaps the most important computational problem associated with any temporal/modal logic, as model checking approaches for [249] 286 Synthese (2008) 165:269-294 such logics have had a substantial degree of success in industry (Clarke et al. 2000) . The explicit state model checking problem for QCL is as follows:
Given a model M, state s in M, and formula ϕ of QCL, is it the case that M, s | QC L ϕ?
Notice that in this version of the problem, we assume that the components of the model M are explicitly enumerated in the input. It is known that the corresponding problem for Coalition Logic may be solved in polynomial time O(|M| · |ϕ|) (Pauly 2001, p. 50 ; as may the explicit state ATL model checking problem, Alur et al. 2002) . Perhaps surprisingly, the QCL model checking problem is no worse:
Theorem 6 The explicit state model checking problem for QCL may be solved in polynomial time.
Proof (Summary.) The obvious source of difficulty is with cooperation operators [P] and P . So consider [P]ϕ, as the P case is similar. We need to check whether ∀C ⊆ Ag: C | cp P implies ∃S ∈ E(C, s) such that ∀s ∈ S, we have M, s | QC L ϕ. Now consider the naive approach: exhaustively checking each C ⊆ Ag. We have running time O(2 Ag ). But consider the representation of E: in the input we must list the value of E for all C ⊆ Ag and s ∈ S. The size of this representation is O(|S| · 2 Ag ), and so running time is polynomial in the size of the input as required.
Of course, this result is not terribly useful, since it assumes a representation of M that is not feasible, since it is exponentially large in the number of agents and Boolean variables in the system. Implemented model checkers use succinct languages for defining models; for example, the reactive modules language (RML) of Alur and Henzinger (1999) . Assuming an RML representation, Coalition Logic model checking is PSPACE-complete (van der Hoek et al. 2005b) , and thus no easier than theorem proving in the same logic (Pauly 2001, p. 60) . It is therefore more meaningful to ask what the model checking complexity of QCL is for such a representation. We only give a very brief summary of RML-space restrictions prevent a complete description; see Alur and Henzinger (1999) , van der Hoek et al. (2005b) for details.
In reactive modules, a system is specified as a collection of modules, which correspond to agents. Here is a (somewhat simplified) example of an RML module:
This agent toggle, controls a single Boolean variable, x. The choices available to the agent at any given time are defined by the init and update rules. The init rules define the choices available to the agent with respect to the initialisation of its variables, while the update rules define the agent's choices subsequently. The init rules define two choices for the initialisation of this variable: assign it the value or the value ⊥. Both of these rules can fire initially, as their conditions ( ) are always satisfied; in fact, only one of the available rules will ever actually fire, corresponding to the "choice made" by the agent on that decision round. With respect to update rules, the first rule says that if x has the value , then the corresponding choice is to assign it the value ⊥, while the second rule 'does the opposite'. In other words, the agent non-deterministically chooses a value for x initially, and then on subsequent rounds toggles this value. In summary, the actions available to an agent in any given state correspond to the rules whose l.h.s. fire against the current state of the system; the agent will actually select only one of these actions to perform, which results in it updating the variables it controls.
Theorem 7 The model checking problem for QCL assuming an RML representation for models is PSPACE-complete.
Proof PSPACE-hardness follows from the fact that QCL subsumes Coalition Logic, for which the corresponding problem is PSPACE-hard ( This result, we believe, is potentially much more interesting than that for explicit state model checking, since it tells us that QCL model checking is no more complex than Coalition Logic even for a realistic representation of models.
Complexity of satisfiability
While the model checking problem addresses itself to the question of the truth of a formula ϕ for a specific interpretation M, s, the satisfiability problem asks whether there exists an interpretation M, s that satisfies ϕ. The presence of the existential quantifier here suggests that satisfiability is going to be harder than model checking, and in general, it is (at least with respect to explicit state model checking). For CL, we know that the complexity of satisfiability varies from NP-complete in the simplest case (Pauly 2001, p. 62) up to PSPACE-complete in the case of weak playability models (as used in the present paper; Pauly 2001, p. 66) . In this section, we show that, despite its comparative succinctness, the satisfiability problem for QCL is no harder than that of CL:
Theorem 8 The satisfiability problem for QCL (parameterised by the coalition predicate language with subseteq, supseteq as primitives) is PSPACE-complete.
Proof Since QCL subsumes Pauly's CL, we immediately have a PSPACE lower bound: it only remains to prove the upper bound, i.e., that the problem is in PSPACE. The proof makes use of another language: another quantified variant of CL, which we will refer to as CLQ. As we will see, the relationship of CLQ to CL is roughly that of Quantified Boolean Formulae (QBF) to conventional propositional logic. Formally, for the syntax of this language, we assume a finite stock of coalition variables, C V = {c 1 , . . . , c k }, and the usual quantifiers {∀, ∃}. Let CL(C V ) be the language of Pauly's Coalition Logic in which coalition variables are allowed to be used instead of explicitly listed sets of agents. For example, c p ∨ q, where c ∈ C V , will be a formula of CL (C V ), with the intended meaning that the coalition denoted by c can achieve p ∨ q. The syntax of CLQ is then defined by the following grammar:
where Q ∈ {∀, ∃}, c ∈ C V is a coalition variable, P is a coalition predicate, and ψ is a formula of CL(C V ).
For example, the following is a formula of CLQ:
The semantics of CLQ are straightforward, and we will not present it here. (We essentially add the obvious rules to deal with quantifiers to the rules for cl.) Satisfiability for CLQ is defined in the obvious way. We assume the conventional definitions of closed formulae, and free and bound variables. Now, the following fact is immediately evident:
Every formula ϕ of QCL can be translated to a formula θ(ϕ) of CLQ such that ϕ is satisfiable in CL iff θ(ϕ) is satisfiable in CLQ; moreover, the translation θ(·) can be carried out in polynomial time (and hence the size of θ(ϕ) is polynomial in the size of ϕ).
Formally, the translation function θ is defined as follows:
Thus, for example, the following QCL formula translates to the CLQ formula (4), above.
The correctness of the translation θ is immediate from the semantics of QCL, CL, and CLQ.
Next, we say that a CLQ formula is in prenex normal form if it has the following syntactic structure:
where each Q i is a quantifier expression (e.g., "∃c 2 : subseteq({1, 2, 3})") such that coalition variables in each Q i are distinct, and ϕ is a formula of CL(C V ) such that ϕ contains no free variables (i.e., every coalition variable occurring in ϕ is bound to a quantifier). Now, we have the following:
Every CLQ formula ϕ in the range of θ can be translated into a prenex normal form formula ρ(ϕ) of CLQ such that ϕ is satisfiable in CLQ iff ρ(ϕ) is satisfiable in CLQ; moreover, the translation ρ(·) can be carried out in polynomial time (and hence the size of ρ(ϕ) is polynomial in the size of ϕ).
Of course, this statement is not in general true for quantified modal logics, but it holds for formulae in the range of θ , which is enough for our purposes. The translation into prenex normal form makes use of the usual translation rules for first-order formula (Gallier 1987, pp. 205-209) . For example, we have the following CLQ equivalences:
Notice that this kind of translation into prenex normal form is not possible in QCL, since each quantifier in a QCL operator is inextricably tied to an ability operator. This is in fact why QCL does not have a prenex normal form, and this in turn explains why we introduce QCL.
The final step is to prove the following claim:
Claim 1 The satisfiability problem for CLQ formulae in prenex normal form is in PSPACE.
We sketch the design of a recursive Turing machine T that decides the problem in polynomial space. Formally, T takes as input a prenex normal form CLQ formula ϕ together with a partial interpretation for coalition variables, I : C V → 2 Ag . The machine uses as a subroutine Pauly's PSPACE decision procedure sat (·) for Coalition Logic (Pauly 2001, p. 65) . Initially, the machine is called with I being empty, i.e., no variables are interpreted. On input ϕ, I , the machine behaves as follows:
1. If ϕ contains no quantifiers, then for every variable c ∈ dom I , systematically substitute I (c) for c in ϕ. After this process is complete, we will be left with a formula ϕ * of CL; invoke Pauly's decision procedure sat (·) on ϕ * , and "accept" if it is satisfiable, otherwise "reject". 2. If ϕ is of the form ∃c : P ψ, then for each C ⊆ Ag, if C | cp P then invoke T with input ψ, I ∪ {c → C} ; if any such call accepts, then "accept". If we complete the loop without such success, then "reject". 3. If ϕ is of the form ∀c : P ψ, then for each C ⊆ Ag, if C | cp P then invoke T with input ψ, I ∪{c → C} ; if any such call rejects, then "reject". If we complete the loop without such failures, then "accept".
Correctness of the approach is immediate from construction. The algorithm clearly terminates, and operates in time PSPACE P S P AC E = PSPACE. In sum, our PSPACE decision procedure for QCL is as follows: given a formula ϕ, invoke the Turing machine T with input ρ(θ (ϕ)), ∅ . If the machine accepts on this input, then ϕ is satisfiable, otherwise it is unsatisfiable.
[253] 
Coalition size
As we noted earlier, an obvious omission from our language of coalition predicates is designated predicates for expressing cardinality properties of coalitions. In this section, we explore extensions to the framework for this purpose. The obvious approach is to introduce primitive coalition predicates geq(n), where n ∈ N, with semantics as follows:
Given this predicate, we can define several obvious derived predicates (see also Ågotnes et al. 2006 for a discussion of a similar language).
The first natural question is whether geq(n) is definable in QCL. Indeed it is:
However, we again see that such a definition leads to exponentially large formulae, which justifies extending the predicate language of QCL with an atomic coalition predicate geq(n) for every n ∈ N. Call the resulting logic QCL(≥), and let | cp≥ and | QC L(≥) denote the satisfiability relations for QCL(≥) predicates and QCL(≥) formulae, respectively. Once again, the gain is not expressiveness but succinctness. As another example of the added succinctness, consider the CL formula C p. In QCL this cannot in general be written by any less complex formula than subseteq(C) ∧ supseteq(C) p, but in QCL(≥) it can be simplified somewhat to supseteq(C) ∧ ¬geq(|C| + 1) p (which in general is simpler since one of the enumerations of the agents in C is replaced by a number). A subtle but important issue when reasoning with the logic is the way in which the natural number argument of the geq(. . .) predicate is represented. Suppose, (following standard practice in complexity theory), that we represent the argument in binary. Now, we ask whether a given coalition predicate P is satisfiable, where P contains a constraint geq(n). Now checking the satisfiability of such constraints is not obviously in NP. The problem is that the witness C to the satisfiability of P is exponentially larger than the constraint geq(n). Of course, if we express the natural number n in unary, then this is not an issue. But unary is not a realistic or practical representation for numbers. It turns out, however, that we do in fact get NP completeness for the satisfiability problem also for QCL(≥), although the argument requires some more work. The reason is that we can use an efficient encoding of the witness C. This was shown by Ågotnes et al. (2006) for a similar problem (cf. Sect. 7).
Lemma 3 Any satisfiable QCL(≥) predicate P is satisfied by a coalition of no more than 1 + max P agents, where 1 + max P equals max({|Ag(P) |, max({geq(n) : geq(n) ∈ subp(P)})}) Proof Suppose P is a QCL(≥) predicate and C | cp≥ P. If |C| ≤ max P we are done, so assume that |C| > max P . In addition to the constraints C 1 -C 4 in the proof of Theorem 1, we get two additional types of constraints corresponding to geq(n) and ¬geq(n) expressions, respectively: there exist a sequence of numbers n 5 1 , . . . , n 5 k 5 , n 6 1 , . . . , n 6 k 6 such that
In other words:
Let's call the two constraints n 5 and n 6 constraints. We proceed by the same two cases as in the proof of Theorem 1. In case 1 (there are C 1 constraints) we are done, so assume case 2 (no C 1 constraints). If Ag(P) = Ag we are done (|C| ≤ Ag(P)), so assume that there is an agent a * ∈ Ag such that a * ∈ Ag(P). Let C be a coalition satisfying the following: (i) C ⊆ C, (ii) C 2 ⊆ C and (iii) |C | = max P . It is easy to see that such a coalition exists. Finally, let C * = C ∪ {a * }. It is easy to see that C * satisfies the C 2 , C 3 and C 4 constraints. By point (iii) in the construction it also satisfies the n 5 constraint. Finally, since we assumed that |C| > max P we get that |C| ≥ |C * |, and since we have that the n 6 constraints holds for C it thus follows that it also holds for C * . Hence, all the constraints hold for C * , so C * | cp≥ P-and |C * | = 1+max P .
Theorem 9 The satisfiability problem for QCL(≥) coalition predicates is NPcomplete.
Proof It suffices to show that a satisfiable predicate has a "short certificate"; see the proof of Theorem 1. Let P be a QCLC coalition predicate. Suppose C | cp P. It might be the case that C contains agents which are not mentioned in P, i.e., that X (C, P) = C\Ag(P) is non-empty. By inspecting the definition of the satisfiability relation, we see that the satisfaction of P by C does not depend on the actual agent names in X (C, P) in the following sense: for any agent a in X (C, P), we can replace a with any other agent b ∈ (C ∪ Ag(P)), and retain satisfaction of P.
[255] 292 Synthese (2008) 165:269-294 Of course, satisfaction of P might depend on the size of X (C, P). More precisely: the only information needed about X (C, P) in order to determine that C satisfies P, is the size of X (C, P)-the actual names of the agents in X (C, P) are not needed in order to interpret P. This makes it possible to encode the satisfying coalition C more efficiently than just enumerating the agents it contains: we only need to list the agents C ∩ Ag(P), and give the size of X (C, P). The latter can be encoded in binary. By Lemma 3 a satisfiable predicate is satisfied by a coalition with X (C, P) no greater than max({geq(n) : geq(n) ∈ subp(P)}). Thus, to verify that a QCLC predicate P, with any occurrences of numbers n in geq(n) encoded in binary, is satisfiable, we can (i) guess a coalition C such that |C| ≤ max P + 1 encoded in such a way that only agents in Ag(P) are listed explicitly and the remainder of the coalition is only represented by a number m encoded in binary; and (ii) verify that C | cp P. It is easy to see that the size of the encoding of the model is polynomial in the size of the encoding of the predicate, and that (ii) can be done in time polynomial in the size of C and P.
It is straightforward to lift the translation τ from QCL to CL to the case when also the additional predicates of QCL(≥) are allowed, and it is easy to see that Theorem 2 holds also for QCL(≥) formulae. For axiomatisation, we only need to add axioms for the geq(n) predicates to the predicate calculus. That can be achieved simply by adding (6) as an axiom schema. A more "direct" axiomatisation of geq(n) is shown in Table 3 , taken from Ågotnes et al. (2006) . Let cp≥ denote derivability in the QCL predicate calculus (from Table 2 ) extended with the axioms in Table 3 
An example
To illustrate the use of QCL(≥) for reasoning about multi-agent systems, consider the expression of majority voting:
An electorate of n voters wishes to select one of two outcomes ω 1 and ω 2 . They want to use a simple majority voting protocol, so that outcome ω i will be selected iff a majority of the n voters state a preference for it. No coalition of less than cp supseteq({a 1 }) ∧ · · · ∧ supseteq({a k }) → geq(k) ∀i = j a i = a j majority size should be able to select an outcome, and any majority should be able to choose the outcome (i.e., the selection procedure is not influenced by the "names" of the agents in a coalition). One outcome must be selected, but both outcomes should not be selected simultaneously.
We express these requirements as follows. First: any majority should be able to select an outcome:
No coalition that is not a majority can select an outcome:
Either outcome ω 1 or ω 2 must result:
Both outcomes cannot be selected simultaneously:
Notice that majority voting cannot be succinctly specified using regular Coalition Logic.
Related work and conclusions
Quantified Coalition Logic (QCL) adds a limited but useful form of quantification to Coalition Logic. The computational problems of model checking and satisfiability for QCL are no worse (although of course no better) than the corresponding problems for Coalition Logic. The motivation for our work is succinctness rather than expressiveness: while QCL is exactly as expressive as Coalition Logic, it is exponentially more succinct. While first-order temporal logics have been studied in the literature, and CL can be seen as the next-time fragment of ATL which again is a generalisation of the branching-time temporal logic Computational Tree Logic (CTL), we are not aware of any other work on quantification in CL or ATL. Lately, there has been some work on generalising the coalition modalities in another direction: to explicitly include actions and strategies (van der Hoek et al. 2005a; Ågotnes 2006) .
Languages similar to the coalition predicate languages of QCL and QCL(≥) are discussed in Ågotnes and Walicki (2006) , Ågotnes et al. (2006) in the context of epistemic logic, where the arguments to the predicates are sets of formulae rather than sets of agents. The predicate (corresponding to) supseteq(X ) means that the reasoner knows at least the formulae in X ; the predicate subseteq(X ) means that he knows at most X ; the predicate geq(m) that he knows at least m formulae, etc. A crucial difference is that the set of all possible formulae that can be known is assumed to be [257] 294 Synthese (2008) 165:269-294 infinite, as opposed to the assumption that the set of all possible agents is assumed to be finite in QCL and QCL(≥). Dropping the assumption of a finite bound on the number of agents in coalition logic might be interesting. In that case, we can no longer quantify over all possible formulae/agents by using conjunction or disjunction, and many of the definability results mentioned in this paper do not hold. For example, as discussed in the mentioned works, neither subseteq(·) nor geq(·) would be definable by supseteq(·), but the two operators supseteq(·) and geq(·) form an adequate set-they can express all the predicates discussed in this paper (even when there is no bound on the number of agents).
Further opportunities for future work include a more detailed understanding of the relationship between QCL and Boolean modal logic.
